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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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State Department review completed

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USSR-BERLIN: The Soviets and Western Allies yesterday exchanged written proposals for a Berlin settlement.

The exchange was the result of an agreement, reached between Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov and US Ambassador Rush on 2 September, to compare notes before the next formal session of the four-power talks on 30 September. The proposals were to represent each side's conception of a Berlin settlement that would take into account the interests of both sides.

The Soviet proposal makes some ostensible concessions to the Western interest in gaining improvements in access to and movement within Berlin, but it does not accept this as a subject for four-power negotiations. Instead, it states that "under an understanding between the USSR and GDR" unspecified measures will be taken to facilitate visits of West Berliners to "the territory of the GDR" and that there will be as "uninterrupted an implementation as possible of the necessary peaceful ties between West Berlin and foreign countries." In contrast, the Allies suggested that a four-power agreement incorporate guarantees of "unimpeded" West German access to Berlin and of movement between the Eastern and Western sectors of the city.

In return for its limited offer, the Soviet proposal asks that the three Western powers agree to prevent "third countries"--West Germany--from doing anything in West Berlin which would affect the "legitimate rights and interests" of others or "complicate" the situation in West Berlin. It specifies that the long list of West German activities submitted by Abrasimov at the 9 June four-power meeting be included in the category of impermissible activities. Abrasimov at that time demanded that an end be put to a broad range of West German political and official activity in West Berlin, as well as all "revanchist" and "hostile" political and propaganda activity. The Allies have indicated Bonn's willingness to cease demonstrative activities of the chancellor, president, cabinet, and parliament, but not the more drastic cutbacks in activity that the Soviets demand.

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The Soviets did not directly address themselves to the Allied proposal that the East acknowledge West Germany's right to represent the interests of West Berlin in dealings with third countries. However, there is as yet no give in Moscow's insistence that West Berlin is an independent political entity.

At this stage the Soviets probably are intent on speeding the pace of the talks and moving them into substantive detail, as well as probing the Western position. Their proposal probably goes far enough to encourage exploratory efforts from the West.

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CHILE: [redacted] believes  
the armed forces are ready to move to prevent an  
Allende government [redacted]

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the armed forces and national police are prepared  
to take over the government if they can find a con-  
stitutional pretext that would elicit the support  
of the troops of all services. [redacted] believes  
that Allende would destroy the armed forces as they  
now exist within six months. [redacted]

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[redacted] commented to  
[redacted] that the military ap-  
peared to be the only obstacle to Allende's rapid  
moves to take over the country. He also said that  
a moral or constitutional excuse was needed for mil-  
itary action and avoided a question on whether the  
armed forces could move to confront Allende without  
the danger of an internal split. What the military  
would consider as an appropriate excuse was not de-  
fined. [redacted]

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[redacted] did not consider  
civil war a real possibility, but he did admit that  
widespread violence would strain the armed forces'  
capabilities and that extremist groups could prob-  
ably sabotage public facilities and factories pro-  
ducing essential products. [redacted]

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BELGIUM - CONGO (K): The Belgian Government sees a new anti-Belgian trend in Congolese policy, and wants consultations with Washington in order to prevent President Mobutu from playing Belgium off against the US.

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